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Estimating Fiscal Multipliers: News From
A Nonlinear World1
Nonlinear Fiscal Multipliers
Giovanni Caggiano, Efrem Castelnuovo, Valentina Colombo, Gabriela Nodari
We estimate nonlinear VARs to assess to what extent scal spending multipliers are countercyclical in the United
States. We deal with the issue of non-fundamentalness due to scal foresight by appealing to sums of revisions of
expectations of scal expenditures. This measure of anticipated scal shocks is shown to carry valuable information
about future dynamics of public spending. Results based on generalized impulse responses suggest that scal spending
multipliers in recessions are greater than one, but not statistically larger than those in expansions. However,
nonlinearities arise when focusing on "extreme" events, i.e., deep recessions vs. strong expansionary periods.
How large is the scal spending multiplier? Following the lead of Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), several VAR models featuring scal aggregates have been estimated to
answer this question (for a survey, see Ramey (2011a)). However, the quantication of
scal multipliers with standard VARs is controversial for two reasons. First, as stressed
by Parker (2011), the e¤ects of scal policy shocks may very well be countercyclical.
Fiscal multipliers may be larger in periods of slack because of a milder crowding out
of private consumption and investment due to less responsive prices (see the textbook
IS-LM-AD-AS model), a constrained reaction of nominal interest rates due to the zero-
lower bound (Eggertsson (2010), Christiano et al. (2011), Woodford (2011), Leeper et al.
(2011), and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012)), higher returns from public spending due
to countercyclical nancial frictions and credit constraints (Canzoneri et al. (2011)),
and lower crowding out of private employment due to a milder increase in labor market
tightness (Michaillat (2014), Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2014)). Empirical evidence in favour
of state-dependent scal multipliers is provided by, among others, Tagkalakis (2008),
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a, 2013b), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Batini
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et al. (2012), Mittnik and Semmler (2012), Baum et al. (2012), Fazzari et al. (2014).1
Second, anticipation e¤ects are likely to be of great relevance in the transmission of scal
policy shocks, a phenomenon often referred to as "scal foresight" (see, among others,
Yang (2005), Fisher and Peters (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2011), Ramey (2011b), Forni
and Gambetti (2014a), Kriwoluzky (2012), Favero and Giavazzi (2012), Leeper et al.
(2013), Ellahie and Ricco (2013)). Modeling a standard set of U.S. variables with a
medium-scale structural model that allows for foresight up to eight quarters, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2012) nd that about sixty percent of the variance of government
spending is due to anticipated shocks. Unfortunately, in presence of scal foresight,
standard VARs - which rely on current and past shocks to interpret the dynamics of
the modeled variables - are typically "non-fundamental", in that they do not embed the
information related to "news shocks", i.e., future shocks anticipated by rational agents.2
Leeper et al. (2013) work with a variety of scal models and show that the anticipation
of tax policy shocks severely a¤ects VAR exercises aiming at identifying scal shocks.
Forni and Gambetti (2010) and Ramey (2011b) show that government spending shocks
estimated with standard scal VARs are predictable, i.e., they are non-fundamental.
This paper estimates state-dependent scal multipliers by explicitly addressing the
issue of scal foresight. We tackle the issue of non-fundamentalness by jointly modeling
a measure of anticipated ("news") scal spending shocks along with a set of standard
macro-scal variables. Such a measure of scal news is the sum of revisions of ex-
pectations about future government spending collected by the Survey of Professional
Forecasters. As shown by Forni and Gambetti (2014a), this measure of scal shocks is
particularly powerful to capture the e¤ects of scal spending shocks when the imple-
mentation lag of scal policy is larger than one quarter, a very plausible assumption as
for U.S. scal policy decisions.3 We include this measure of scal news in a nonlinear
Smooth Transition Vector AutoRegressive (STVAR) model, which we use to discrim-
1Other forms of state-dependence have been identied in the literature. Corsetti et al. (2012)
investigate the sensitivity of government spending multipliers to di¤erent economic scenarios. They nd
scal multipliers to be particularly high during times of nancial crisis. Rossi and Zubairy (2011) and
Canova and Pappa (2011) show that scal multipliers tend to be larger when positive spending shocks
are accompanied by a decline in the real interest rate. Perotti (1999) shows that scal multipliers may
depend on the debt-to-GDP ratio in place when scal shocks occur. For a DSGE-based quantication
of scal multipliers in presence of normal vs. abnormal debt-to-GDP ratios, see Cantore et al. (2013).
2For a recent discussion on non-fundamentalness in the VAR context and a survey of the main
contributions in this area, see Beaudry and Portier (2014).
3Yang (2005) shows that the average implementation lag for major postwar U.S. income tax leg-
islation is about seven months. Mertens and Ravn (2011) nd that the median implementation lag is
six quarters. Leeper et al. (2012) calibrate tax foresight and government spending foresight to range
between two and eight quarters (the former) and between three and four quarters (the latter).
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inate dynamic responses to scal shocks in bad and good times (i.e., recessions vs.
expansions). Our multipliers are computed as the integral of the impulse response
of output (up to a chosen horizon) divided by the integral of the response of scal
expenditure (up to the same horizon) and rescaled by the sample mean value of the
output-public spending ratio.4 To assess the e¤ects of public spending shocks on output
and estimate scal multipliers in recessions and expansions, we compute Generalized
Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs), which model the endogeneity of the transition
from a state to another after a scal shock. Importantly, as explained by Koop et al.
(1996), GIRFs allow us to scrutinize the role played by di¤erent initial conditions. We
then isolate "extreme" events, i.e., deep recessions and strong expansions, with the aim
of understanding if scal multipliers are larger in very severe economic conditions. To
our knowledge, this key policy-relevant question has not been previously studied in the
empirical literature on scal multipliers.
Our results are the following: i) anticipated scal expenditure shocks trigger a signif-
icant reaction of output; ii) such a reaction is not statistically di¤erent across di¤erent
phases (recessions/expansions) of the U.S. business cycle; iii) the reaction becomes sta-
tistically di¤erent for extreme phases of the business cycle, i.e., deep recessions vs.
strong expansions; iv) scal multipliers in recessions are statistically larger than one;
v) spending shocks in recessions have a noticeable stabilization e¤ect and substantially
reduce the probability that the economy will remain slack. These results are robust
to a wide battery of checks, including i) the employment of a "purged" measure of s-
cal news, which is constructed using information available to survey respondents when
they formulate their expectations over future public spending, to account for potential
identication issues; ii) the use of the scal news constructed by Ramey (2011b), which
allows us to extend our sample back to 1947, to control for small-sample biases that may
a¤ect our data-intensive estimator; iii) the role of debt, to account for the role played
by scal strains in computing multipliers; iv) several di¤erent VAR specications.
Our paper represents a novel contribution under several respects. First, our VAR
jointly accounts for two relevant issues for the quantication of scal multipliers: scal
foresight and state dependence. Second, we estimate the response of economic aggre-
gates to scal shocks via GIRFs, which allow us to endogenise the possibly stabilizing
e¤ects of scal policy. Third, the use of GIRFs allows us to address a previously unex-
4Our results are robust to to the employment of an alternative way of computing scal multipliers,
i.e., the ratio of the "peak" value of the impulse responses of output and public spending rescaled
by the sample mean ratio of the levels of ouput over public spending. Our Appendix (available upon
request) documents the results obtained with this alternative way of computing scal multipliers.
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plored issue, i.e., the role played by business cycle conditions for the quantication of
scal multipliers, which we investigate by distinguishing between "extreme" and "mod-
erate" business cycle phases. As a result, we are able to establish some new stylized
facts about government spending multipliers in the U.S., in particular the fact that rm
evidence of state dependence arises only when looking at extreme phases of the business
cycle.
The closest papers to ours are Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a), Owyang
et al. (2013), and Ramey and Zubairy (2014). Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012,
2013a) employ a STVAR model and nd evidence of countercyclical scal multipliers.5
There are substantial di¤erences between Auerbach and Gorodnichenkos contributions
and ours. First, they investigate the role of unanticipated scal spending shocks. Dif-
ferently, we focus on anticipated changes in scal spending. Second, their impulse
responses are conditionally linear, i.e., expansionary scal spending shocks are, by con-
struction, not allowed to drive the economy out of a recession. As pointed out by the
same authors, this assumption provides an "upper bound" for their estimates of the
scal multiplier in recessions, because it does not allow the returns from scal spending
to be decreasing as the economy exits a recession. Our approach links the evolution of
the variables in our STVAR to the probability of being in a recession, which is then
endogenously modeled. Third, our focus is on "extreme" events, i.e., realisations on
the tails of the distribution of our business cycle indicator (like the 2007-09 crisis). Our
main result is that, while scal multipliers may be acyclical when recessions and expan-
sions are considered all alike (i.e., they may be similar when considering the average
e¤ect in recessions vs. expansions), they are likely to be large in presence of particularly
severe economic conditions. Owyang et al. (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) em-
ploy local-projection methods à la Jordï£ ¡(2005) to investigate the nonlinearity of scal
multipliers. They nd no evidence of larger scal multipliers during downturns as for
the United States. The comparability between our exercises and theirs is not immediate
due to a number of di¤erent modeling choices (construction of the news shocks, length
of the sample, construction of the impulse responses, among others). We notice that
our results are similar to theirs in that we also do not nd larger scal multipliers in
recessions on average. However, when it comes to deep recessions vs. strong expansions,
we nd such larger multipliers to arise.
Other strands of the literature have dealt with scal foresight and anticipated s-
cal spending shocks in VARs. Mertens and Ravn (2010) recover the non-fundamental
5For a similar exercise focusing on the role of business condence, see Bachmann and Sims (2012).
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responses to an anticipated scal policy shock via economic theory-driven restrictions
to gauge information about economic agents anticipation rate. Such a rate is then
used as an input in Blaschke matrices to ip the roots that cause the non-invertibility
of the VMA representation of scal spending and output. Kriwoluzky (2012) recov-
ers reduced-form innovations by estimating a VARMA model using the Kalman lter.
Then, he identies anticipated scal shocks via theoretically-supported sign restrictions.
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) follow a narrative approach to identify exogenous changes
in military spending related to wars. Ramey (2011b) constructs a measure of changes
in the expected present value of government spending. Fisher and Peters (2010) con-
struct a measure of excess returns of large U.S. military contractors which is shown to
anticipate future military spending shocks. Ben Zeev and Pappa (2014) identify U.S.
defense news shocks as the shocks that best explain future movements in defense spend-
ing over a ve year horizon and are orthogonal to current defense spending. All these
contributions show that, at least qualitatively, anticipated positive scal shocks induce
a signicant increase in output.6 Perotti (2007, 2011), Ramey (2011b), Blanchard and
Leigh (2013), Alesina et al. (2014), Forni and Gambetti (2014a), and Ricco (2014) work
with expectations revisions in di¤erent modeling frameworks. Our paper complements
these contributions, in that it quanties the e¤ects of anticipated scal spending shocks
with a nonlinear model focusing on extreme events.7
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 1 deals with the issue of non-
fundamentalness in the macro-scal context due to the presence of scal foresight, and
explains why the sums of revisions of scal expectations variable employed in our analy-
sis helps solving the issue. Section 2 o¤ers statistical support to the role of nonlinearities
in this context and presents the Smooth Transition VAR model employed in our analy-
sis. Our main results are shown in Section 3, which deals with the computation of
scal multipliers in recessions and expansions, and Section 4, which focuses on extreme
6Another interesting approach to account for scal foresight rests on the use of municipal bond
spreads. This bond spread is well-known to have predictive power for tax changes and can therefore
be used to control for anticipated tax changes (see, among others, Poterba (1989), Fortune (1996),
and Kueng (2014)). Leeper et al. (2012) show that spreads with maturity lengths of 1 and 5 years are
very informative about future tax events. Our paper deals with anticipated scal spending shocks. We
leave the analysis of anticipated tax shocks to future research.
7Admittedly, the theoretical papers modeling nonlinearities cited in this Introduction mainly con-
sider models in which government spending is implemented without lags. As for the zero lower bound,
however, Christiano et al. (2011) conduct an exercise in which they model implementation lags in
their framework featuring the zero lower bound. They nd that a key determinant of the size of the
multiplier is indeed the state of the world in which new government spending comes on line. Our con-
jecture is that such asymmetric e¤ects may be present also when anticipated scal shocks hit economic
systems characterised by state-dependent nancial constraints and labor market downward rigidities.
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events. Section 5 documents a battery of robustness checks. Concluding remarks are
provided in Section 6.
1 Non-Fundamentalness and Expectations Revisions
The role of expectations revisions. As previously anticipated, standard scal VARs
may return severely biased impulse responses in presence of news shocks. Consider the
model
yt = Etyt+1 + gt + !t (1)
gt = "t h + 1"t h 1 + : : :+ q h 1"t (q 1) + q h"t q = (L)"t (2)
where jj < 1; i > 0 8i; h  0; q  h, and 0 = 0. The forward-looking process yt
- say, output measured as log-deviations from its trend - is a¤ected by the exogenous
stationary process gt - say, a scal process - plus a random shock !t, which is assumed
to capture non-scal spending shocks a¤ecting output and which is assumed to be i:i:d:
with zero mean and unit variance. The process (2) features q   h + 1 moving average
terms. If h = 0 and q > 0, the process (2) features an unanticipated, "t; as well
as anticipated shocks "t q for q > 0. For h > 0, the process (2) would feature only
anticipated shocks, where h is the number of periods of foresights. The process gt is a
news-rich process if jij > 1 for at least one i > 0 (Beaudry and Portier (2014)). In
all cases, f"t jgqj=h is said to be fundamental for gt if the roots of the polynomial (L)
lie outside the unit circle (Hansen and Sargent (1991)). Importantly, if the gt process
is non-fundamental, its structural shock is not recoverable by employing current and
past realisations of gt only. Consequently, its impulse response to an anticipated shock
as well as the dynamic responses of other variables in this example, yt will not be
correctly recovered by estimating a VAR in yt and gt.
We assume that agents have rational expectations and observe news shocks without
noise.8 It can be shown that, if the period of foresight h > 1 is known, the problem of
8Forni et al. (2013) investigate the case in which economic agents deal with noisy news. Agents
are assumed to receive signals regarding the future realization of TFP shocks. Since such signals are
noisy, agents react not only to genuinely informative news, but also to noise shocks that are unrelated
to economic fundamentals. They nd that such noise shocks explain about a third of the variance of
output, consumption, and investment. We leave the quantication of the role of noise shocks in the
6
non-fundamentalness in model (1)-(2) can be solved by alternatively including: i) the
h-step-ahead expectation, Etgt+h; if h = q; ii) the h-step-ahead expectation revision,
Etgt+h Et 1gt+h; if h < q. However, if h > 1 is unknown, expectation revisions are not
of help. To solve this issue, Forni and Gambetti (2014a) propose to use a news variable
dened as
g1J =
XJ
j=1
(Etgt+j   Et 1gt+j) =
8><>:
 
1 + 1 + :::+ J h

"t if J < q 
1 + 1 + :::+ q h

"t if J > q
; (3)
which correctly identies the news shock if J > h.9 Our Appendix provides further
discussions and derivations as regards this news variable.
The News13 variable. We will then consider a scal VAR augmented with a
measure of news constructed by summing up revisions of expectations as follows:
g13 =
X3
j=1
(Etgt+j   Et 1gt+j) (4)
where Etgt+j is the forecast of the growth rate of real government spending from
period t + j   1 to period t + j based on the information available at time t. Hence,
Etgt+j   Et 1gt+j represents the "news" that becomes available to private agents
between time t 1 and t about the growth rate of government spending j periods ahead.
We use data coming from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which collects
forecasts conditional on time t  1 of variables up to time t+3. This is the reason why
our baseline analysis will be conducted by considering the variable g13.
10
Information content of expectations revisions. To assess the statistical rel-
evance of our news variable for the dynamics of public expenditure, we regress public
scal context to future research.
9If J < h; the news variable would have no predictive content about scal shocks, and it would
be equal to zero. In our sample, however, this never happens. This is consistent with the evidence
in Leeper et al. (2012), who report an average implementation lag of about three quarters. In our
example above, h should be interpreted as the minimum temporal gap between the announcement of
the implementation of future scal spending and the realization of the spending itself (which may take
more than one quarter), rather than the mean value. Hence, also the e¤ects of the announcement of
future spending whose full implementation would take more than J quarters would be captured by our
news, as long as the minimum lag h is less than J .
10SPF data are a¤ected by frequent changes in the base years. Forecast errors on the growth rates
are not a¤ected by these changes. Hence, they are preferable to forecast errors computed with SPF
levels. About this point, see also Perotti (2011).
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spending on a constant and three lags of the dependent variable, public receipts, real
GDP, and one lag of the measure of news g13 (a detailed description of the data is
provided in Section 3). This regression augments the public spending equation of a
trivariate VAR system modeling the "usual suspects" (public spending, tax receipts,
output) with our news variable lagged one period.11 Public spending shocks are often
identied with a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals.
Hence, the (orthogonalised) residuals of the public spending equation are interpreted
as public spending shocks. As shown in Table 1 - which collects the p-values for our g13
variable in the equation described above - news shocks are found to carry signicant in-
formation about the future evolution of public spending. This implies that the trivariate
scal VAR without news is non-fundamental. Digging deeper, we nd that all the three
components (forecast revisions) included in g13 have some predictive power. Overall,
this empirical exercise highlights the signicant contribution of news revisions regarding
future realisations of public expenditure. Di¤erently, revisions of expectations based on
nowcasting, i.e., Etgt   Et 1gt, turn out to be insignicant at the 90% condence
level (see Table 1, last column). In line with Ricco (2014), this result suggests that
revisions based on "nowcasts" (revision of expectations at time t of contemporaneous
public expenditures) are possibly of help in identifying truly unanticipated scal shocks,
rather than anticipated, news shocks.12
Overall, our results i) show that, from a statistical standpoint, residuals typically
employed in a standard trivariate scal VAR cannot be interpreted as scal shocks;
ii) suggest that the components of the variable g13, which we interpret as a measure
of anticipated scal shocks, can augment the information content of our VAR system.
These results are consistent with the outcome of the Granger-causality tests conducted
by Forni and Gambetti (2014a), who show that g13 Granger-causes scal spending at
di¤erent horizons.13
11The regression includes variables in (log-)levels and the news g13 variable in cumulated sums to
preserve the same order of integration. This is consistent with the modeling choices of our baseline
VAR analysis (specied in the next Section).
12These results are conditional on news variables constructed as revisions of the mean predicted
values of the levels of future government spending as collected by the Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers. Similar results were obtained by employing median values of such forecasts, as well as variables
expressed in growth rates.
13In a recent paper, Perotti (2011) questions the use of the SPF forecast errors employed by Ramey
(2011) to isolate scal spending anticipated shocks. In particular, he shows that the one-step-ahead
predictive power of the forecast revisions as for federal spending is quite modest, since such revisions
are shown to be noisy. Our results are fully consistent with Perottis (2011) analysis, in that we also
reject the relevance of very short-term SPF forecast revisions on future scal spending. This evidence
suggests the need of searching for anticipation e¤ects beyond one-quarter relative to the moment in
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Extreme realisations of the news spending variable: An interpretation.
Figure 1 plots our news variable (an updated version of Forni and Gambetti (2014a)s).
The standardised variable g13 conveys useful information about scal policy shocks in
the United States. To see this, we isolate the seven realisations which exceed two in
absolute value, and provide an interpretation based on the recent U.S. scal history. The
1983Q1 positive realisation is associated to Ronald Reagans "Evil Empire" and "Star
Wars" speeches, with which the U.S. President announced a forthcoming increase in
military spending. The 1986Q1 negative spike reects the speech given in January 1986
by Mikhail Gorbachev, who proposed decommissioning all nuclear weapons by 2000
in the early stage of the "Perestrojka" period. The 1987Q1 positive forecast revisions
might be due to the mid-term Senate elections won by the Democrats in November 1986
plus the questioned constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced-Budget
Act. The 1987Q4 forecast revisions are due to announcements about spending cuts for
the Pentagon. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 is behind the negative spike
in 1989Q4. The war in Afghanistan rationalises the positive peak in 2001Q4. Finally,
the upward spike in 2009Q1 can be associated to Obamas stimulus package.
Comparison with Rameys (2011b) news variable. Figure 1 also plots the
military spending news variable constructed by Ramey (2011b), and extended up to
2010Q4 by Owyang et al. (2013).14 It appears that the g13 variable anticipates changes
in Rameys, or at least it is not anticipated by the latter. To corroborate this state-
ment, we run Granger-causality tests based on an estimated bivariate VAR with one
lag involving the military spending news proposed by Ramey (2011b) (as well as its
updated version by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy, 2013) and the g13 variable. Table 2
collects the outcome (p-values associated to testing the null hypothesis that the column
variable does not Granger-cause the alternative news measure) of this exercise for our
benchmark sample and a shorter sample to account for the fact that, for the rst ve
years in the benchmark sample, Rameys (2011b) variable is equal to zero. While the
contribution of our news shock variable nds large statistical support, Granger-causality
running from Rameys shock to ours is clearly rejected by the data. The same evidence
emerges when employing the news variable by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013),
which includes observations related to the 2007-2009 recession. Again, these results are
in line with those reported in Forni and Gambetti (2014a), who also nds Rameys news
which predictions are formulated, and supports the employment of a variable like g13.
14Ramey (2011b) employs Business Week and other newspaper sources to construct an estimate of
changes in the expected present value of goverment spending (nominal spending divided by nominal
GDP one period before).
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shock to be predicted by forecast revisions over one quarter.
2 Econometric Approach: A STVAR Macro-Fiscal
Model
Modeling choices. We assess the state-dependence of scal spending multipliers to
news shocks by estimating a Smooth-Transition VAR model (for an extensive presen-
tation, see Terï£ ¡svirta et al. (2010)). Our STVAR framework reads as follows:
xt = F (zt 1)R(L)xt + (1  F (zt 1))E(L)xt + "t; (5)
"t  N(0;
t); (6)

t = F (zt 1)
R + (1  F (zt 1))
E; (7)
F (zt) = exp( zt)=(1 + exp( zt));  > 0; zt  N(0; 1): (8)
where xt is a set of endogenous variables which we aim to model, F (zt 1) is a
transition function which captures the probability of being in a recession,  regulates
the smoothness of the transition between states, zt is a transition indicator, R andE
are the VAR coe¢ cients capturing the dynamics of the system during recessions and
expansions (respectively), "t is the vector of reduced-form residuals having zero-mean
and whose time-varying, state-contingent variance-covariance matrix is 
t, and 
R
and 
E stand for the covariance structure of the residuals in recessions and expansions,
respectively. The modeling assumption is that the variables can be described with a
combination of two linear VARs, one suited to describe the economy during recessions
and the other during expansions. The transition from a state to another is regulated
by the standardised transition variable zt. The smoothness parameter  a¤ects the
probability of being in a recession F (zt), i.e., the larger the value of , the faster the
transition from a state to another. Notably, the model (5)-(8) allows for nonlinearities
to arise from both the contemporaneous and the dynamic relationships of the economic
system.
Our baseline analysis refers to the vector xt = [gt; tt; yt; 
g
13;t]
0, where g is the log
of real government (federal, state, and local) purchases (consumption and investment),
10
t is the log of real government receipts of direct and indirect taxes net of transfers to
business and individuals, and y is the log of real GDP.15 The construction of g and t
closely follows Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a).16 The variable g13 is the public
expenditure news variable (4). The variables are expressed in levels because of possible
cointegration relationships. Consistently, the variable g13 is considered in cumulated
sums to preserve the same order of integration as the other variables included in the
vector. Our sample of U.S. data spans the period 1981Q3-2013Q1, 1981Q3 being the
rst available quarter to construct the news variable.17
The choice of the transition variable zt and the calibration of the smoothing para-
meter  are justied as follows. As in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Bachmann
and Sims (2012), Caggiano et al. (2014), and Berger and Vavra (2014), we employ a
standardised moving average of the real GDP quarter-on-quarter percentage growth
rate.18 We calibrate the smoothness parameter  to match the observed frequencies of
the U.S. recessions as identied by the NBER business cycle dates, i.e. 15% in our
sample. Then, we dene as "recession" a period in which F (zt) > 0:85, and calibrate
 to obtain Pr(F (zt) > 0:85)  15%. This metric implies a calibration  = 2:3. The
choice is consistent with the threshold value z =  0:75% discriminating recessions and
expansions, i.e., realisations of the standardised transition variable z lower (higher)
than the threshold will be associated to recessions (expansions).19 Figure 2 plots the
transition function F (zt). Clearly, high realisations of F (zt) tend to be associated with
15Our scal aggregates are constructed using the Bureau of Economic AnalysisNIPA Table 3.1.
Current tax receipts are constructed as the di¤erence between current receipts and government social
benets. Fiscal expenditure is the sum of consumption expenditure and gross government investment
from which we subtract the consumption of xed capital. Data on real GDP and the implicit GDP
deator (which we use to deate all nominal series) are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.
16Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013a) check and verify the robustness of the results in Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012) to the employment of a di¤erent denition of the net tax series that avoids
the double-counting of mandatory Social Security contributions.
17Our interpretation of the news variable here is that of an instrument to gauge the real e¤ects of
anticipated changes in scal spending. We recall that di¤erent identication approaches may very well
lead to the construction of di¤erent, but in principle equally valid, instruments. For an elaboration of
this point, see Favero and Giavazzi (2012).
18The transition variable zt is standardised to render our calibration of  comparable to those
employed in the literature. We employ a backward-looking moving average involving four realizations
of the real GDP growth rate.
19The corresponding threshold value for the non-standardised moving average real GDP growth rate
is equal to 0.34%. The sample mean of the non-standardised real GDP growth rate in moving average
terms is equal to 0.71, while its standard deviation is 0.50. Then, its corresponding threshold value
is obtained by "inverting" the formula we employed to obtain the standardised transition indicator z,
i.e., znonstd =  0:75 0:50 + 0:71 = 0:34:
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NBER recessions. Importantly, our results are robust to the employment of alternative
calibrations of the slope parameter  that imply a number of recessions in our sam-
ple ranging from 10% to 20%, where the lower bound is determined by the minimum
amount of observations each regime should contain according to Hansen (1999) (checks
not shown here for the sake of brevity, but available upon request).
Identication of the anticipated scal shock. Following Fisher and Peters
(2010), we order the news variable g13 last in our vector and orthogonalise the reduced-
form residuals of the VAR via a Cholesky-decomposition of the variance-covariance
matrix. We analyze the implications of this versus alternative strategies to identify
scal news shocks in Section 4.
Statistical evidence in favour of nonlinearity and model estimation. For
our vector of endogenous variables xt, we test and clearly reject the null hypothesis
of linearity in favour of the (Logistic) Smooth Transition Vector AutoRegression via
the multivariate test proposed by Terï£ ¡svirta and Yang (2013) in presence of a single
transition variable. Details on this test and its implementation are presented in our
Appendix.
Model estimation. Given the high nonlinearity of the model, we estimate it
via the Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain algorithm developed by Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003). The (linear/nonlinear) VARs include three lags. This choice is based on the
Akaike criterion applied to a linear model estimated on the full-sample 1981Q3-2013Q1.
3 Generalized Impulse Responses and Fiscal Mul-
tipliers
This Section reports the estimated impulse responses to an anticipated scal spending
shock. Following Koop et al. (1996), we compute generalized impulse responses to take
into account the interaction between the evolution of the variables in the vector xt and
the transition variable, the latter being directly inuenced by the evolution of output.
In other words, we model the feedback from the evolution of output in the vector xt
to the transition indicator zt and, consequently, the probability F (zt 1). Hence, in
computing our GIRFs, the probability F (z) is endogenised.20 Koop et al. (1996) and
20Recall that our transition indicator zt  14 (yt +yt 1 +yt 2 +yt 3), i.e., the relationship
between zt and yt i; i = 0; 1; 2; 3 features no stochastic elements. Hence, stochastic singularity
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Ehrmann et al. (2003) show that initial conditions a¤ect the computation of the GIRFs.
In our benchmark exercise, we randomize over all possible histories within each state,
so to control for the role of initial conditions.21 We compute the GIRFs by normalizing
the news shocks to one.22
GIRFs. Figure 3 reports the impact of a government spending news shock com-
puted with our linear and nonlinear VARs. The responses obtained with our linear
model point to a delayed short-run increase in government expenditure and output,
and a decrease in government receipts. Public spending reaches its peak value after
about three years. Di¤erently, output increases for the rst three quarters after the
shock, then gradually goes back to zero, and crosses the zero line about 10 quarters
after the shock.
Next, we look at the evidence coming from the nonlinear VAR. Interestingly, the
estimated response of output is persistently stronger under recessions. Output increases
in expansions in the short-run, but the increase is much milder compared to recessions,
and vanishes after about four quarters. Another di¤erence between the two states is
the reaction of government spending itself, which is always positive but stronger in
recessions. Tax receipts react asymmetrically in the short run, then their patterns
become more similar.
Are the reactions of output in recessions and expansions di¤erent from a statistical
standpoint? Figure 4 plots the GIRFs and the associated 90% condence intervals es-
timated for both states. Focusing on output, we see that the condence bands overlap
substantially. This result suggests that the reaction of output to a scal shock is not
prevents us from estimating our model jointly with the evolution of zt. Following Koop et al. (1996),
our GIRFs are based on simulations that take into account the link between xt and zt after the
estimation of our econometric framework.
21Following Koop et al. (1996), our GIRFs are computed as follows. First, we draw an initial
condition, i.e., starting values for the lags of our VARs as well as the transition indicator z, which
- given the logistic function (8) - gives us the value for F (z). Then, we simulate two scenarios, one
with all the shocks identied with the Cholesky decomposition of the VCV matrix (7), and another
one with the same shocks plus a  > 0 corresponding to the rst realization of the news shock. The
di¤erence between these two scenarios (each of which accounts for the evolution of F (z) by keeping
track of the evolution of output and, therefore, z) gives us the GIRFs to a scal news shock . Per
each given initial condition z, we compute 500 di¤erent stochastic realizations of our GIRFs, then
store the median realization. We repeat these steps until 500 initial conditions (drawn by allowing for
repetitions) associated to recessions (expansions) are considered. Then, we construct the distribution
of our GIRFs by considering these 500 median realizations. Our Appendix provides details on the
algorithm we employed to compute the GIRFs.
22The standard deviation of the news variable employed in the sample is 0.19 according to our linear
model, 0.21 conditional on our framework under recessions, and 0.18 under expansions. While being
theoretically size-dependent, we veried that the sensitivity of our impulse responses to reasonable
changes in the size of the shock is negligible.
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necessarily stronger if the economy is slack. This nding is in line with some recent
results put forth by Valerie Ramey and coauthors (see Ramey (2011b), Owyang et al.
(2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014)), which are obtained with a di¤erent identi-
cation strategy (scal spending news shocks constructed following Rameys (2011b)
approach) and methodology (local projections à la Jordà (2005)). At a rst glance, the
evidence seems to be at odds with the impulse response analysis proposed by Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a), who nd a statistically signicant di¤erence between
the response of output conditional on di¤erent states. However, a subtle di¤erence in
the construction of the dynamic responses must be considered. Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012, 2013a) assume the economy hit by the scal shock to start and remain
in a recession/expansion for twenty quarters. Di¤erently, here we allow the economic
system to switch from a state to another according to the endogenous evolution of
the transition indicator. Moreover, the GIRFs plotted in Figure 4 are constructed by
integrating over all histories belonging to a given state (recessions, expansions). We
elaborate on the role played by initial conditions in Section 4.
Quantifying the multipliers. We now turn to the key issue of computing the
multipliers and the associated 90% condence intervals. We compute the "sum" (cu-
mulative) multiplier as the integral of the response of output divided by the integral of
the response of scal expenditure, i.e.,
PH
h=1 yh=
PH
h=1 gh, where H is a chosen horizon.
Percent changes are then converted into dollars by rescaling such a ratio by the sample
mean ratio of the levels of output over public spending.23 This measure is designed to
account for the persistence of scal shocks (Woodford (2011)).
Our results are reported in Table 3, where multipliers have been computed consid-
ering horizons from one to ve years. The evidence clearly speaks in favour of larger
(short-run) scal spending multipliers in recessions, with values between 3.05 after 8
quarters and 1.00 after 20 quarters. The point-estimates of our multipliers in expan-
sions are substantially lower (from 0.33 to -2.27 after 8 and 20 quarters, respectively).
The multipliers under recession are statistically larger than one in the short run (i.e.,
for the rst four quarters).
23Ramey and Zubairy (2014) warn against this practice by noticing that, in a long U.S. data sample
spanning the 1889-2011 period, the output-over-public spending ratio varies from 2 to 24 with a mean
of 8. Hence, the choice of a constant value for such ratio may importantly bias the estimation of the
multipliers. In our sample, the mean value of such a ratio is 6, and it varies from 5.39 to 6.76. Hence,
the commonly adopted ex-post conversion from the estimated elasticities to dollar increases does not
appear to be an issue for our exercise. The average value of the output-public spending ratio in our
sample in 5.81 in NBER recessions, and 6.02 in NBER expansions. Our results are robust to the
employment of state-dependent output-public spending ratios.
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Are multipliers statistically bigger in recessions? We answer this question by con-
structing a test based on the di¤erence between the multiplier estimated under reces-
sions and expansions. Such a test is constructed to account for the correlation between
the estimated state-dependent multipliers.24 Figure 5 plots the distribution of the di¤er-
ence of our multipliers for a range of horizons of our impulse responses along with 90%
condence bands. Evidence in favour of state-dependent multipliers would be gained if
zero were not included in the condence bands. In all cases, although marginally, the
di¤erence turns out to be not di¤erent from a statistical standpoint.25
The stabilizing e¤ects of anticipated scal shocks. Our STVAR allows also
to estimate the impact of government spending shocks on the probability of being in a
recession for each given horizon of interest after the shock. Figure 6 plots the estimated
transition function implied by our model, [F (z); along with the 90% condence bands.
The Figure gives interesting information about the estimated impact of a positive gov-
ernment spending shock on the likelihood of remaining in the same phase of the business
cycle. Looking at the behavior of the [F (z) under recession, we notice that the scal
shock leads to a clear drop in the probability of remaining in recession. Given the large
uncertainty surrounding the response of output to a scal shock, di¤erent paths of [F (z)
are admittedly possible. However, the median indication clearly suggests a quick fall
of such a probability under the threshold value F = 0:85 just after ve quarters, which
is exactly the average duration of a NBER recession in the sample. In terms of the
econometric methodology employed to estimate the state-dependent e¤ect of govern-
ment spending shocks on output, this evidence shows the importance of allowing for the
possibility of switching from one phase of the business cycle to another. Unsurprisingly,
given its expansionary e¤ect, the probability of falling into a recession after the news
shock when starting from an expansions is basically zero, though such a probability is
quite imprecisely estimated.
24In short, we compute di¤erences of our multipliers in recessions vs. expansions conditional on
the same set of draws of the stochastic elements of our model as well as the same realizations of the
coe¢ cients of the vector. The empirical density of the di¤erence between our multipliers is based on
500 realizations of such di¤erences for each horizon of interest.
25Importantly, our results are not driven by the systematic component of our STVAR per se. In
other words, in absence of scal interventions, our model economy does not deliver large negative
accumulated multipliers at longer forecast horizons when starting in expansions. This was veried by
simulating a deterministic version of the STVAR, in which only initial conditions are responsible for
the di¤erent evolution of the variables in recessions and expansions. Our simulations conrm that our
cumulated multipliers are indeed driven by the interaction between scal shocks and the systematic
component of our STVARs.
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4 Fiscal Multipliers in Presence of "Extreme" Events
Extreme events analysis. So far, our analysis has focused on the possible state-
dependence of output reactions to scal news shocks and scal multipliers, nding
weak evidence in favour of countercyclical spending multipliers. The next question
we address is whether evidence of nonlinearities might arise when recessions and ex-
pansions are "extreme" events. We then re-compute the GIRFs by randomizing over
di¤erent subsets of histories associated to recessions and expansions. We label "deep"
recessions/"strong" expansions the histories associated to realisations of the transition
variable which are below/above two standard deviations. Given that our transition vari-
able is standardised, this amounts to saying that all historical realisations of z above
two are associated to a strong expansion, while all realisations below minus two are
associated to a deep recession. This criterion leads us to isolate four realisations in
deep recessions corresponding to the recent great recession (2008Q4-2009Q3) and three
realisations which belong to the "strong" expansions category (1983Q4-1984Q2). In
a complementary fashion, mild recessions/weak expansions are associated to histories
consistent with realisations of the transition variable below/above the threshold value
z =  0:75 but within the range [ 2; 2]. We then re-compute the GIRFs by randomizing
over histories within each of these four sub-categories.
Figure 7 shows the GIRFs obtained by distinguishing between "deep" and "mild"
recessions and "strong" and "weak" expansions. The estimated GIRFs show that the
response of output is roughly proportional to the strength of the recession (expansion).
Although in the short-run the response of output in the case of a "mild" recession is very
similar to the response of output in a "deep" recession, the response of output is much
more persistent at longer horizons when conditioning on the latter case. This, however,
cannot be immediately turned into evidence about multipliers, since the persistence in
output response might be driven by the persistence of government spending.
Table 4 reports the scal multipliers estimated in the four di¤erent cases under
scrutiny. Interestingly, multipliers are still larger in recessions relative to expansions,
regardless of the strength of the recession (expansion). When the economy is in a deep
recession, we nd the 4-year horizon multiplier to be 1.6. A similar gure can be gauged
for mild recessions, where government spending is found to be expansionary after up
to four years. In strong expansions, short-run (one-year) multipliers are slightly above
one, but they take negative values at longer horizons. Interestingly, while the di¤erence
between mild recessions and weak expansions might seem minimal, the impact of scal
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policy in these two states is much more dramatic. Such a di¤erence may be interpreted
in light of the di¤erent response of scal revenues in the two states (at least in the short-
run). In good times, government receipts are found to increase after the shock, while in
bad times they are found to decrease. In other words, our VAR suggests that recessions
are associated to decit-nanced increases in public spending, while expansions are
associated to increases in scal spending which are readily nanced via an increase in
revenues. Hence, recessions are associated with a higher net present value of the scal
decit relative to expansions. This can justify the large and positive real e¤ects of scal
news on the output multiplier if, during recessions, the Ricardian equivalence does not
hold because of, say, binding liquidity constraints during recessions, of rule-of-thumb
consumers. It can also o¤er a rationale for the negative multipliers in strong expansions,
which is a state associated with a clearly positive response of revenues to scal spending
shocks.26
Turning to multipliers in expansions, while our point estimates suggest values above
one in the short-run, 90% condence bands imply that we cannot reject values lower
than unity. A possible interpretation of large short-run multipliers in expansions relates
to the zero lower bound, which has been in place even after the end of the 2007-09
recession, hence in a period classied as ("weak") expansion in our sample. As shown
by Leeper et al. (2011), multipliers may be larger than one when an active scal policy
is accompanied by a passive monetary policy.27
When we turn to statistical di¤erence, a comparison between the multipliers in the
case of "deep" recessions and those conditional on "strong" expansions suggests that the
condence bands do not overlap, and point to a strong evidence in terms of nonlinear
responses of the economy to an expansionary scal shock. Our results are conrmed also
by looking at the distribution of the di¤erence between the estimated state-dependent
multipliers. As shown in Figure 8, the countercyclicality of scal multipliers conditional
on extreme realisations of the business cycle is supported regardless of the horizon.
In our context, it might be more appropriate to test for the null hypothesis of equal
multipliers versus the one-sided alternative of multipliers larger in recessions relative to
expansions. Table 5 collects the fraction of multipliers that are larger in recessions for
26See Barro and Redlick (2011) for a discussion of decit-nanced versus balanced-budget scal
multipliers.
27In our sample, the number of quarters associated to expansions by the NBER in which the zero
lower bound is in place is 15, i.e., some 14% of all the quarters in expansions according to the NBER,
which is a non-negligible share. For an analysis pointing to lower scal spending multipliers in a
liquidity trap caused by a self-fullling state of low condence in a model with nominal rigidies and a
Taylor-type interest rate rule, see Mertens and Ravn (2014).
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both "Normal" (recessions/expansions) and "Extreme" (deep recessions/strong expan-
sions) phases of the business cycle. As before, these numbers are estimated by referring
to di¤erent initial conditions, all else being equal. Hence, any entry greater than or
equal to 90 might be interpreted as evidence in favour of larger multipliers in recessions
at a 90% condence level in the context of a one-sided test. The gures corresponding
to the exercises conducted so far refer to the "Baseline" scenario. Under the "Normal"
(i.e. all recessions vs. all expansions) case, evidence in favour of countercyclical multi-
pliers is not present for all horizons. Di¤erently, the analysis of extreme events robustly
points towards larger multipliers during recessions. We postpone the analysis of the
robustness of this result to a number of perturbations of the baseline framework to the
next Section.
How does the economic system evolve after a scal shock hitting during an extreme
phase of the business cycle? Figure 9 plots the estimated value of the [F (z) conditional
on the four scenarios. For deep recessions, a sizeable decrease of the probability of
remaining in such a state occurs as a consequence of the government spending shock:
after about ve quarters, the value of [F (z) decreases from 1 (the economy is in a reces-
sion with probability one) to about 0.5 (the economy is unlikely to be in a recession).
This drop is quicker and more substantial than the one estimated in presence of mild
recessions, and it is also more precisely estimated. Importantly, this suggests that gov-
ernment spending can be e¤ective in lifting the U.S. economy from a deep recession
to an expansionary path. The probability of moving away from a strong expansion is
low, and more precisely estimated than the one of drifting away from a weak expansion.
However, none of the two suggests a high likelihood of falling into a recession.
Estimated multipliers: Comparison with the literature. Our evidence points
to larger multipliers in recessions (around 1.6 for the 4-year horizon), and smaller ones,
but still somewhat high in the short-run (slightly larger than 1 after one year), in expan-
sions. Are these multipliers in line with what suggested by the literature? A close look
at some recent contributions suggests a positive answer. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012, 2013a) deal with unexpected scal shocks in a nonlinear VAR framework and nd
multipliers in recessions of about 2.5. Bachmann and Sims (2012) control for the e¤ects
of business condence and nd the sum and peak multipliers in recessions to be 2.7 and
3.3, respectively. Corsetti et al. (2012) work with a exible panel of OECD countries
that allow them to study the e¤ects of scal spending shocks under di¤erent scenarios.
Conditional on periods of nancial strains, they nd scal spending multipliers to be
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2.3 on impact, 2.9 at the peak, and larger than 2 in the medium run.28 Christiano et al.
(2011) work with a medium-scale DSGE model and nd a multiplier of 2.3 conditional
on the zero-lower bound being in place for one year. Evidence of large multipliers can
be found also in linear frameworks which deal with the issue of scal foresight. Using
Bayesian prior predictive analysis for a battery of closed- and open-economy DSGE
models featuring di¤erent frictions and policy conducts, Leeper et al. (2011) rationalise
scal spending multipliers of two or larger. Ben Zeev and Pappa (2014) nd a peak
multiplier larger than 4. Fisher and Peters (2010), using their measure of excess returns
of large U.S. military contractors, nd a multiplier of 1.5. The same gure is found by
Ricco (2014), who employes a measure of news which accounts for the changes in the
composition of the pool of forecasters compiling the SPF questionnaires. Depending
on the set of restrictions imposed in their sign restriction-VAR analysis, Canova and
Pappa (2011) nd the U.S. scal multipliers to range between 2 and 4.
Our ndings qualify those by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013a), who
suggest that recessions are associated with larger scal spending multipliers. As already
pointed out, their general conclusion might be driven by the implicit assumption that
all recessions are treated like "extreme events" when conducting their impulse response
analysis. Our analysis suggests that this may very well be the case. This nding has
important implications from a policy perspective too, given that a scal stimulus may
be needed exactly in correspondence to deep recessions.
Overall, our analysis based on "disaggregated" recessions and expansions shows that
nonlinearities are likely to arise when we look within each of the two states typically
investigated in a business cycle context, i.e., recessions and expansions. In particular, we
nd support in favour of a larger scal multiplier when deep recessions are considered.
5 Further Investigations
Our baseline analysis suggests that evidence in favour of countercyclical scal multipliers
is borderline when we condition upon recessions vs. expansions, while it becomes much
clearer and solid when conditioning upon extreme events. This Section discusses the
solidity of our results to the employment of i) alternative identication strategies; ii) a
28As reported in the minutes of the Economic Policy Panel Discussion, Giancarlo Corsetti pointed
out that nancial crises, in their study, are not meant to represent recessions. However, he also added
that the multipliers are even larger when one uses macro crisis episodes alone in their panel approach.
See Economic Policy, 2012, 27(72), p. 562.
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longer sample; iii) debt; iv) several di¤erent VAR specications.
5.1 Identication
Exogeneity of the change in government spending expectations. Our baseline
analysis rests on revisions of government spending expectations. Such revisions may in
principle be due to shocks other than merely scal ones. Suppose that gt = zt + t,
where zt is a vector of m indicators of the business cycle (say, output, unemployment,
ination, interest rates),  is the vector of loadings relating zt to gt, and t = "t +
1"t 1+2"t 2+ :::+n"t n is a moving average process modeling the unexpected scal
shock "t as well as the expected ones "t j; j = 1; :::; n. Then, 
g
13 =
X3
j=1
(Etgt+j  
Et 1gt+j) = 
X3
j=1
(Etzt+j   Et 1zt+j) + eg13, where eg13 = X3
j=1
j"t j. In words,
systematic revisions of scal spending forecasts might be due not only to anticipated
scal shocks, but also to revisions of other variables forecasts possibly due to other
shocks (technology, nancial). We deal with this issue by regressing our measure of scal
news g13 on a number of macroeconomic indicators available to professional forecasters
when they are asked to form expectations about G: (the sums of forecasts revisions of)
real GDP growth, unemployment, GDP deator ination, the 3-month Treasury bill
rate, and the 10-year Treasury bond rate.29 Figure 10 displays the raw and purged
versions of the news variable, denoted by g13 and eg13 respectively. Two considerations
are in order. First, the correlation between these two variables is quite high (0.95).
Second, the most extreme realisations, documented in Figure 1 and reproposed here,
are clearly captured by both variables. Hence, most of the information content of the
(unpurged version of the) g13 variable is likely to come from its genuinely exogenous
component. To corroborate this statement, we replace the g13 variable with its purged
version eg13 in our VAR, and re-run our estimations and simulations. Table 6 ("eg13 last")
29Forecasts of the debt-to-GDP ratio are not included in the SPF survey. We run further regressions
by adding lagged realizations of debt-to-GDP ratio to the regression described in the text. Such
measures turn out to be insignicant. The choice of not including the contemporaneous realizations
of the debt-to-GDP ratio on the right-hand side of the regression is due to the timing of the Survey
of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The questionnaire of such survey is sent to the pool of respondents
after the advance report of the national income and product accounts by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) is released to the public. Hence, the questionnaire contains the rst estimate of GDP
and its components for the previous quarter. Thus, in formulating and submitting their projections,
the information sets of the SPF panelists include the data reported in the advance report and related to
quarter t 1 but not data regarding quarter t. For information on the variables included in the survey
and the information set possessed by respondents, see http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
data/real-time-center/survey .
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collects the results of this exercise for our extreme events analysis.30 These results, as
well as those in Table 5 on the di¤erence of the multipliers in extreme business cycle
phases, conrm our baseline ndings.
Contemporaneous e¤ects of scal spending shocks. Another issue a¤ecting
our baseline analysis regards the timing of the impact of the news shocks. The baseline
vector features a recursive identication scheme in which the news variable is ordered
last. This choice aims at purging the movements of the g13 scal variable by accounting
for its systematic response to government spending, tax revenues, and output. However,
such a choice has an obvious limitation, i.e., output is not allowed to move immediately
after the realisation of the news shock. We then perform a robustness check by focusing
on the four-variate VAR xegt = [eg13;t; gt; tt; yt]0, which enables scal news shocks to
a¤ect output on impact.31 We run this exercise with our purged measure of anticipated
scal shocks to control for the systematic movements of scal news due to news hitting
other macroeconomic indicators, as explained above. Table 6 ("eg13 rst") documents
slightly di¤erent, but statistically equivalent, multipliers relative to the baseline. Most
importantly, as also documented by Table 5, we nd again larger multipliers in deep
recessions than in strong expansions.
5.2 Longer Sample
The nonlinear estimator we employ is data intensive. Because of limited data avail-
ability for the SPF forecast revisions, our baseline analysis rests on a relatively short
sample, i.e., 1981Q3-2013Q1. Hence, small-sample issues may lead to distortions of our
estimated coe¢ cients, which could then lead us to obtain biased multipliers. We then
conduct a robustness check by employing a much longer sample, i.e., 1947Q1-2013Q1.
To do so, we use an updated version of Rameys (2011b) widely known scal news vari-
able (available at Valerie Rameys website), and put it rst in a VAR including scal
spending, scal revenues, and output. Following Ramey (2011b), we estimate a VAR
with four lags and a quadratic trend. Table 6 ("Long sample, Rameys news") collects
the outcome of our estimations. Reassuringly, this exercise produces multipliers very
much in line with our baseline ones, and it o¤ers support to the importance of looking
30Multipliers computed by considering a four-year time span. Similar results are obtained when
considering a two-year time span.
31An alternative, not pursued here, would be to work with sign restrictions. For an analysis of sign
restrictions in scal VARs and their implications for the implied scal elasticities, see Caldara and
Kamps (2012).
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at extreme events to nd nonlinearities in the scal multipliers even in long samples.
5.3 The Role of Debt
Our baseline VAR does not feature debt. However, controlling for debt uctuations
in our regressions is important to better understand the drivers of our countercyclical
multipliers. The reason is simple. Recent panel-data studies have shown that countries
with "high" levels of debt have smaller multipliers than countries with lower levels
of debt (see, e.g., Corsetti et al. (2012), Ilzetzki et al. (2013)). Hence, it could in
principle be possible that the nonlinearities we have found are driven by di¤erent levels
of debt rather than di¤erent phases of the business cycle. It is then of interest to
check if the relevant initial conditions could be related to di¤erent degrees of scal
distress. To this aim, we modify our baseline vector along two dimensions. First,
we include the debt/GDP ratio in our VAR. Following a common modeling choice in
the literature (see, among others, Leeper et al. (2011), Leeper et al. (2012), Corsetti
et al. (2012), and Leeper et al. (2013)), we assume the debt/GDP ratio to a¤ect the
scal instruments with a lag, and put it last in the vector. Second, we employ our
debt/GDP ratio as the variable which dictates the switch from a regime to another. This
second modication is exactly aimed at capturing the idea of di¤erent "debt-contingent"
regimes. To discriminate between "high" vs. "low" realisations of debt, we focus on
the cyclical component of the debt/GDP ratio, which is extracted from the raw series
(in log) by applying a standard Hodrick-Prescott lter with smoothing weight equal to
1,600. realisations of the debt/GDP ratio one standard deviation above (below) the HP-
trend are interpreted as phases of "high" ("low") debt. Positive (negative) realisations
within one standard deviation are classied as "moderately high" ("moderately low").
A possible interpretation of this series is that of a "debt/GDP gap" computed by
considering a time-varying debt/GDP target, which may be consistent with the clear
upward-trending behavior displayed by this ratio in our sample.
Table 6 ("Debt/GDP ratio") collects the multipliers produced by this exercise. We
distinguish between extreme phases of "high" and "low" scal distress, as well as in-
termediate ones, i.e. "moderately high" and "moderately low", which we indicate with
"Mod:+ debt" and "Mod:  debt", respectively. Our results point to fairly similar scal
multipliers when computed conditional on "high" vs. "low" debt levels. Hence, coun-
tercyclical scal multipliers do not seem to be guided by the "scal cycle".32 Our results
32An analysis conducted by adding the debt-to-GDP ratio to our otherwise baseline framework
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echo those by Favero and Giavazzi (2012), who also nd no major empirical di¤erences
in a scal model for the U.S. when adding debt. It is important to stress, however, that
this conclusion is not inconsistent with cross-country studies which point to relevant
nonlinearities of scal policy e¤ects due to di¤erent levels of debt, in particular for
developing countries.
5.4 Further Robustness Checks
Our results are robust to a variety of further perturbations of our baseline model, which
include: i) a "FAST-VAR" (Factor Augmented Smooth Transition-VAR) version of our
VAR model, which we estimate to further control for non-fundamentalness as suggested
by Forni and Gambetti (2014b); ii) the estimation of a ve-variate VAR featuring the
sum of forecast revisions regarding future real GDP as rst variable in the vector, again
to control for revisions of real GDP forecasts; iii) the employment of revisions over total
spending forecasts (as opposed to Federal spending only); iv) a measure of news which
accounts for the changes in the composition of the pool of forecasters compiling the SPF
questionnaires as in Ricco (2014).33 The solidity of our baseline results is conrmed also
by this battery of robustness checks, which is available upon request.
6 Conclusions
This paper quanties the scal spending multiplier in the U.S. and tests the theoret-
ical prediction of a larger reaction of output to scal shocks in economic downturns.
Following Forni and Gambetti (2014a), we tackle the issue of non-fundamentalness due
to scal foresight by identifying anticipated government spending shocks via sums of
forecasts revisions collected by the Survey of Professional Forecasters. We show that
such a measure of scal spending news carries relevant information to predict the future
evolution of scal expenditures and Granger-causes other measures of scal news re-
cently proposed in the literature. Then, we augment a macro-scal nonlinear VAR with
this measure of scal news and estimate the size of scal spending multipliers across
di¤erent phases of the business cycle.
while keeping the moving average of real GDP as our transition indicator returned multipliers very
similar to our baseline ones.
33We thank Giovanni Ricco for providing us with his measure of scal news.
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Our empirical investigation points to scal multipliers larger than one in recessionary
periods. However, conditional on a standard "recessions vs. expansions" classication
of the phases of the U.S. business cycle, our results do not support the idea of a coun-
tercylical scal multiplier. Di¤erently, when we condition the estimates of the scal
multipliers on the strength of the business cycle (namely, when we distinguish between
deep and mild recessions, and weak and strong expansions), we nd that scal multi-
pliers are statistically larger in deep recessions relative to strong expansionary periods.
The results of our paper highlight the relevance of the di¤erent initial economic
conditions within each of the two states typically considered for classifying the U.S.
business cycle. Fiscal multipliers may very well be larger when a scal shock occurs
in presence of a deep recession like that of 2007-09 than when it occurs in presence
of milder economic downturns. Our results imply that a correct measurement of the
scal multipliers can be performed just if exible-enough econometric models are put
at work.
University of Padova
University of Melbourne
University of Verona
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News (1; 3) (1; 1) (2; 2) (3; 3) (0; 0)
p  value 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:11
Table 1: Anticipated Fiscal Spending Shocks: Statistical Relevance. P-values related to
the exclusion Wald-test of one period-lagged News variables entering (one at a time) a
regression involving government spending (dependent variable), a constant, three lags of
government spending, three lags of scal receipts, and three lags of real GDP. Figures in
bold are associated to a predictive power of news found to be signicant at a 10 percent
condence level. News are expressed in cumulated terms to have an order of integration
comparable to that of the other variables. Estimation conducted by considering Newey-
West standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Sample Ramey g13 ORZ 
g
13
1981:III-2008:IV 0:44 0:06
1986:IV-2008:IV 0:28 0:02
1981:III-2010:IV 0:71 0:06
1986:IV-2010:IV 0:59 0:02
Table 2: News à la Ramey vs. Forecast Revisions: Granger-Causality Tests. Ramey
stands for the news variable employed by Ramey (2011), ORZstands for its updated
version employed by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). P-values related to the
exclusion Wald-test of one period-lagged covariate of interest. Figures in bold are asso-
ciated to a predictive power of news found to be signicant at a 10 percent condence
level. Results based on a bivariate VAR with one lag. Null hypothesis: Column variable
does not Granger cause the alternative news measure.
Horizon=State Expansion Recession
4 1:73
[0:52;3:50]
3:15
[1:71;4:27]
8 0:33
[ 1:05;2:77]
3:05
[0:68;4:70]
12  0:57
[ 2:24;1:54]
2:13
[0:13;3:82]
16  1:41
[ 3:96;0:74]
1:54
[ 0:42;2:95]
20  2:27
[ 6:23; 0:01]
1:00
[ 0:94;2:47]
Table 3: Fiscal Spending Multipliers. Figures conditional on our baseline VAR analysis.
Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean of output
over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
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Hor:=State Strong exp: Deep rec: Weak exp: Mild rec:
4 1:03
[ 0:51;2:03]
3:42
[2:05;4:35]
1:69
[0:64;3:40]
3:09
[1:71;4:14]
8  0:26
[ 2:01;0:84]
3:42
[1:22;5:14]
0:30
[ 0:87;2:83]
2:94
[0:56;4:46]
12  1:32
[ 3:68; 0:03]
2:21
[0:61;3:54]
 0:62
[ 2:15;1:48]
2:06
[0:03;3:78]
16  2:26
[ 5:63; 0:78]
1:60
[0:18;2:63]
 1:40
[ 3:91;0:65]
1:38
[ 0:48;3:02]
20  3:28
[ 7:00; 1:56]
1:09
[ 0:31;2:07]
 2:37
[ 6:08;0:01]
0:83
[ 0:97;2:54]
Table 4: Fiscal Spending Multipliers: Extreme Events. Figures conditional on our VAR
analysis with GIRFs conditional on four di¤erent sets of initial conditions. Log-values
of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean of output over public
spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
Scenario/Horizon Cycle h=4 h=8 h=12 h=16 h=20
Baseline Normal 84.8 91.6 93.6 95.4 96.6
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
~g13 last Normal 78.2 86.4 89.4 90.6 92.6
Extreme 100 100 100 100 100
~g13 rst Normal 58.2 76.2 82.2 89.8 92.0
Extreme 71.6 93.0 97.8 98.8 99.2
Long sample (Rameys news) Normal 82.8 89.6 87.6 86.4 86.6
Extreme 90.2 92.8 92.8 93.0 93.6
Table 5: Fiscal Spending Multipliers: Shares of Multipliers Larger in Recessions. Nor-
mal scenarios: Fraction of multipliers which are larger in recessions than expansions
out of 500 draws from their empirical distributions. Extreme scenarios: Fraction of
multipliers which are larger in deep recessions than strong expansions out of 500 draws
from their empirical distributions. hidenties the number of quarters after the shock.
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Scenario=State Strong exp: Deep rec: Weak exp: Mild rec:
Baseline  2:26
[ 5:63; 0:78]
1:60
[0:18;2:63]
 1:40
[ 3:91;0:65]
1:38
[ 0:48;3:02]eg13 last  1:57
[ 2:92; 0:91]
2:28
[1:23;3:10]
 0:44
[ 1:97;2:29]
2:16
[0:22;3:00]eg13 first  0:70
[ 2:50;0:43]
2:36
[0:99;4:29]
0:66
[ 1:04;2:90]
2:50
[0:59;4:39]
Long sample (Rameys news) 0:15
[ 0:24;0:53]
1:74
[0:08;3:92]
0:07
[ 1:23;0:96]
1:52
[0:60;4:62]
High debt Mod:+ debt Mod:  debt Low debt
Debt=GDP ratio 0:68
[0:15;1:37]
0:74
[ 1:02;1:15]
1:33
[0:95;1:66]
1:33
[0:81;1:97]
Table 6: Fiscal Spending Multipliers: Extreme Events. Di¤erent Scenarios. Four-year
integral multipliers. Figures conditional on our VAR analysis with GIRFs conditional
on four di¤erent sets of initial conditions. Log-values of the impulse response of output
rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 1: News13 (This Paper) vs. Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairys (2013) News Vari-
able. Blue, solid line: News variable constructed by considering the sum of Survey of
Professional Forecastersforecast revisions regarding future public spending from one-
to-three quarter-ahead. Extreme values, interpretation: (a) 1983Q1: Reagans "Evil
Empire" and "Star Wars" speeches; (b) 1986Q1: Perestrojka; (c) 1987Q1: Senate elec-
tions won by the Democrats a quarter before; (d) 1987Q4: Spending cuts as for the
Pentagon; (e) 1989Q4: Berlin wall; (f) 2001Q4: War in Afghanistan; (g) 2009Q1:
Obamas stimulus package. Red, dashed line: News variable constructed by Owyang,
Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), who extended Rameys (2011) news variable up to 2010Q4.
Rameys (2011) variable is constructed by considering the present discounted value of
expected changes in defense spending (nominal spending divided by nominal GDP one
period before). Both news measures in this Figure are standardised.
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Figure 2: Probability of Being in a Recessionary Phase. F (z) computed according to
the logistic function presented in the text. Transition variable: Standardised backward-
looking moving average constructed with four realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real
GDP growth rate. Value of the slope parameter: 2.3.
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Figure 3: Generalized Impulse Responses to a Fiscal News (Anticipated) Spending Shock:
Linear Model, Recessions, Expansions. Median responses to a scal news shock nor-
malised to one. News variable constructed as the sum of the revisions of the one, two,
and three step-ahead expectation values over future scal spending growth. News vari-
able expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order of integration as the one
of the log-real variables in the vector. Log-values of the impulse response of output
rescaled by the sample mean of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to
convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 4: Generalized Impulse Responses to a Fiscal News (Anticipated) Spending Shock:
Recessions vs. Expansions. Median responses to a scal news shock normalised to one.
90 percent condence intervals identied with gray areas (recessions) and circled lines
(expansions). Red dashed lines: Recessions. Dotted blue lines: Expansions. News
variable constructed as the sum of the revisions of the one, two, and three step-ahead
expectation values over future scal spending growth. News variable expressed in cu-
mulated terms to have the same order of integration as the one of the log-real variables
in the vector. Sample 1981Q3-2013Q1. VAR models estimated with a constant and
three lags. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean
of output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in
dollars.
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Figure 5: Di¤erence in Multipliers between Recessions and Expansions: All Histories.
Empirical densities of the di¤erences computed as multipliers in recessions minus multi-
pliers in expansions. Densities constructed by considering all recessions and expansions
(initial conditions) present in the sample. Multipliers conditional on the same set of
draws of the stochastic elements of our STVAR model as well as the same realizations
of the coe¢ cients of the vector. Densities based on 500 realizations of such di¤erences
per each horizon of interest. hidenties the number of quarters after the shock.
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Figure 6: Evolution of the Probability of Being in a Recessionary Phase F(z) Consistent
with Our GIRFs. Solid lines: Median reactions. Blue dotted/red dashed lines: 90
percent condence intervals. Black dashed horizontal line: Threshold value to switch
from a regime to another. Probability computed according to the logistic function
presented in the text and the evolution of output conditional on a scal news shock.
Transition variable: Standardised backward-looking moving average constructed with
four realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth rate. Value of the slope
parameter: 2.3.
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Figure 7: Generalized Impulse Responses to a Fiscal News (Anticipated) Spending Shock:
Linear Model, Deep vs. Mild Recessions, Strong vs. Weak Expansions. Deep reces-
sions/strong expansions associated to histories consistent with realizations of our tran-
sition variable which are below/above two standard deviations. Mild recessions/weak
expansions associated to histories consistent with realizations of our transition variable
below/above -0.75 but within the range [-2,2]. Median responses to a scal news shock
normalised to one. News variable constructed as the sum of the revisions of the one,
two, and three step-ahead expectation values over future scal spending growth. News
variable expressed in cumulated terms to have the same order of integration as the
one of the log-real variables in the vector. VAR models estimated with a constant and
three lags. Log-values of the impulse response of output rescaled by the sample mean of
output over public spending (both taken in levels) to convert percent changes in dollars.
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Figure 8: Di¤erence in Multipliers between Recessions and Expansions: Extreme Events.
Empirical densities of the di¤erences computed as multipliers in recessions minus mul-
tipliers in expansions. Densities constructed by considering just extreme realizations of
recessions and expansions (initial conditions) present in the sample. Multipliers con-
ditional on the same set of draws of the stochastic elements of our STVAR model as
well as the same realizations of the coe¢ cients of the vector. Densities based on 500
realizations of such di¤erences per each horizon of interest. hidenties the number of
quarters after the shock.
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Figure 9: Evolution of the Probability of Being in a Recessionary Phase F(z) Consis-
tent with Our GIRFs: Extreme Events. Median reactions and 90 percent condence
intervals. Black dashed horizontal line: Threshold value to switch from a regime to
another. Deep recessions/strong expansions associated to histories consistent with re-
alizations of our transition variable which are below/above two standard deviations.
Mild recessions/weak expansions associated to histories consistent with realizations of
our transition variable below/above -0.75 but within the range [-2,2]. Probability com-
puted according to the logistic function presented in the text and the evolution of output
conditional on a scal news shock. Transition variable: Standardised backward-looking
moving average constructed with four realizations of the quarter-on-quarter real GDP
growth rate. Value of the slope parameter: 2.3.
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Figure 10: News13 vs. News13 Purged. Blue, solid line: News variable constructed by
considering the sum of Survey of Professional Forecastersforecast revisions regarding
future public spending from one to three period-ahead. Red, dashed line: News vari-
able constructed by regressing News13 over a constant and the sums of the forecasts
revisions of real GDP growth, unemployment, GDP deator ination, the three-month
Treasury bill rate, and the 10-year Treasury bond rate. Extreme values, interpreta-
tion: (a) 1983Q1: Reagans "Evil Empire" and "Star Wars" speeches; (b) 1986Q1:
Perestrojka; (c) 1987Q1: Senate elections won by the Democrats a quarter before; (d)
1987Q4: Spending cuts as for the Pentagon; (e) 1989Q4: Berlin wall; (f) 2001Q4: War
in Afghanistan; (g) 2009Q1: Obamas stimulus package. Both news measures in this
Figure are standardised.
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